

# No Evidence That an Ebola Outbreak Influenced Voting Preferences in the 2014 Elections After Controlling for Time-Series Autocorrelation: A Commentary on Beall, Hofer, and Schaller (2016)



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Received 6/19/16; Revision accepted 11/1/16

In a recent article, Beall, Hofer, and Schaller (2016) used observational time-series data to test the hypothesis that the 2014 Ebola outbreak influenced the 2014 U.S. federal elections. This represents one example of a recurring psychological interest in using observational data (a) to assess long-term temporal predictions of psychological theories in naturalistic settings (Jebb, Tay, Wang, & Huang, 2015) and (b) to examine how psychological theories can predict cross-population variation in attitudes and behavior (Eppig, Fincher, & Thornhill, 2010; Fincher & Thornhill, 2012; Gelfand et al., 2011; Murray, Schaller, & Suedfeld, 2013; Schaller & Murray, 2008). While such nonexperimental designs hold considerable promise, they also introduce analytic challenges that can lead to spurious inferences if left unaddressed (Hackman & Hruschka, 2013; Hruschka & Hackman, 2014; Hruschka & Henrich, 2013; Jebb et al., 2015; Pollet, Tybur, Frankenhuys, & Rickard, 2014). Here, we use Beall et al.'s analyses to illustrate how using observational data without attention to one long-recognized threat to inference in time-series data—temporal autocorrelation—can lead to spurious inferences (Yule, 1926).

Beall et al. used the coincidence of the 2014 Ebola epidemic and the 2014 U.S. federal elections (as well as ancillary analyses of Canadian elections) to assess two hypotheses derived from theories of the behavioral immune system (Schaller & Murray, 2008). First, they hypothesized that perceived threat of disease should increase political conservatism. Second, they hypothesized that disease threats may increase conformism and lead to a *bandwagon effect*, “the phenomenon in which voters show an increased inclination to support whichever political candidate is

leading in recent polls” (p. 596). Beall et al. assessed these hypotheses by correlating 2-month time series of (a) online searches for the term “Ebola” and (b) daily polling data for U.S. congressional elections, a month before and a month after the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention’s announcement of the first Ebola case in the United States (September 30, 2014). Beall et al. found strong correlations between daily Ebola search volumes during the months of September and October and support for conservative candidates at national and state levels over that same time period. They interpreted this correlation between time series as support for their first hypothesis. Beall et al. also found that correlations between Ebola searches and Republican support were stronger in states that started off with greater support for Republican candidates and with long-standing Republican voting norms, and they interpreted this result as support for the bandwagon effect.

These analyses relied on correlations between two time-series variables—Ebola search volume and daily polling—taken over 2 months. When two variables evolve over time, they can frequently look highly correlated, even without any underlying causal relationship between them (Yule, 1926; see Koplenig & Müller-Spitzer, 2016, for an illustrative example). This results from temporal autocorrelation—greater similarity in data points that are closer to each other in time—and the common existence of long-run trends in time-series data that can create

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many non-independent data points (Jebb et al., 2015). One simple method for dealing with such threats is to *detrend* (i.e., remove the long-term trend from) the time series by analyzing the changes between time points rather than their absolute values. This removes first-order autocorrelation and is often the first step in time-series analysis (Jebb et al., 2015). Calculating changes between absolute values leads to the “loss” of the first observation in the time series. However, in time series in which observations are highly autocorrelated, this does not necessarily represent the real loss of an independent data point, because data points are highly nonindependent.

Here, we applied this simple detrending procedure to the Beall et al. time series and reanalyzed the data (see the Supplemental Material available online for further details). First, we found exceedingly high levels of temporal autocorrelation in the time-series variables ( $r_s > .90$ ). In other words, each observation was nearly perfectly correlated with the observation that came directly before it in the time series. This indicated that detrending was a necessary first step in analyzing the time series (see Table S1 in the Supplemental Material). By detrending the data, we were then able to compare changes between adjacent observations rather than simply compare the absolute values of those observations.

After detrending the data, we found no empirical support for either of the original two hypotheses (Table 1). At both national and state levels, there were no longer strong or significant associations between Ebola search volume and preference for conservative candidates in the U.S. federal elections. The strong correlation in the Canadian elections (based on only nine data points) was still strong but no longer significant and had exceedingly wide confidence intervals. Moreover, there was no support for a moderating bandwagon effect: States leaning Republican

**Table 1.** Comparison of Correlations Between “Ebola” Search Volume and Measures of Voter Intentions

Measure of voter intentions	Beall, Hofer, and Schaller’s (2016) analysis	Detrended analysis (first-order autocorrelation removed)
U.S. national elections	.51*	.30
Canadian national elections	.69*	.65
State elections	.31*	.04
Republican-led polls	.51***	.09
Democrat-led polls	-.08	-.03
Positive (Republican) Partisan Voter Index score	.55***	.13
Negative (Democratic) Partisan Voter Index score	-.12	-.05

Note: Beall et al. examined U.S. national elections in Study 1 and Canadian national elections in Study 3. All other correlations refer to the state-level analyses of Study 2.

\* $p < .05$ . \*\*\* $p < .001$ .

**Table 2.** Comparison of Differences (Cohen’s  $d$ ) Between Correlations of “Ebola” Search Volume and Measures of Voter Intentions

Measure of voter intentions	Beall, Hofer, and Schaller’s (2016) analysis	Detrended analysis (first-order autocorrelation removed)
Republican vs. Democrat leading polls	0.92*	0.24
Positive vs. negative Partisan Voter Index states	1.11**	0.37

\* $p < .05$ . \*\* $p < .01$ .

in either current or past elections did not show correlations greater than zero or correlations greater than those observed in Democratic states (Table 2). These results were robust to the composition of the sample (including or excluding outliers and excluding or including six states with insufficient data on daily changes; see Table S1 in the Supplemental Material).

Given that Beall et al.’s findings were not robust to basic time-series controls and were based on particularly small samples, this strongly suggests that either (a) these initial findings were spurious or (b) the study design used by Beall et al. was insufficiently powered to detect any potential associations or to test the proposed hypotheses. The latter is a clear possibility. For example, the statistical power to detect a statistically significant correlation between fully detrended time series would have been less than 0.5 in both the U.S. study ( $n = 23$ , observed  $r = .3$ ,  $\alpha = .05$ ) and Canadian study ( $n = 8$ , observed  $r = .6$ ,  $\alpha = .05$ ), whereas data from both studies still exhibit substantial second-order correlation (see Table S2 in the Supplemental Material). Many sources of randomness, such as measurement error in either the dependent or independent variables, would further increase the likelihood of null findings. These are all potential limitations of the data used in the original Beall et al. study and reanalyzed here.

We have described one of the simpler tools—detrending to remove first-order correlation—to deal with inferential threats that arise in observational data analysis. Autocorrelation of observed time series is by no means the only threat to inference when working with observational data. For example, using smoothed data, as in Beall et al.’s article (an issue we describe in more detail in the Supplemental Material), can also lead to spurious correlations. Many other useful analytic techniques exist for observational data analysis and are necessary for avoiding common pitfalls. For time-series data, one can also model and remove higher-order trends and seasonality, as well as other factors that introduce temporal autocorrelation (Jebb et al., 2015; in the Supplemental Material, we describe additional simulation approaches for checking inferences that can be used if researchers choose not

to detrend their data). For cross-population comparisons that may be subject to pseudoreplication of units (e.g., Mississippi and Alabama may not really be independent observations in analyses across the 50 U.S. states), one can introduce controls for macroregional variation (Hruschka & Henrich, 2013), conduct spatially autocorrelated regressions (Anselin & Bera, 1998), or remove cultural autocorrelation by looking at changes over cultural phylogenies (Mace & Holden, 2005). To deal with potentially unmeasured confounding variables that are particularly pernicious in observational data, there are fixed-effects models for panel data (Allison, 2009) and instrumental-variable analyses (Angrist, Imbens, & Rubin, 1996). There is a rich literature addressing each of these that includes checks on the assumptions and appropriate implementation of these techniques to best avoid inferential threats introduced by these myriad issues.

### Action Editor

D. Stephen Lindsay served as action editor for this article.

### Author Contributions

L. Tiokhin and D. Hruschka conceived and designed the study. L. Tiokhin analyzed the data. L. Tiokhin and D. Hruschka drafted, revised, and approved the final version of the manuscript for submission.

### Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The authors declared that they had no conflicts of interest with respect to their authorship or the publication of this article.

### Supplemental Material

Additional supporting information can be found at <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/0956797616680396>

### Open Practices



All data and materials have been made publicly available via the Open Science Framework and can be accessed at <https://osf.io/d9jtz/>. The complete Open Practices Disclosure for this article can be found at <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/suppl/10.1177/0956797616680396>. This article has received the badges for Open Data and Open Materials. More information about the Open Practices badges can be found at <http://www.psychologicalscience.org/publications/badges>.

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1 **SUPPLEMENTAL MATERIALS FOR:**

2 No evidence that Ebola outbreak influenced voting preferences in 2014 elections, after  
3 controlling for autocorrelation in time series.

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8 *In Press, Psychological Science*

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10 Open access materials available at <https://osf.io/d9jfv/>

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12 **MATERIALS AND METHODS**

13 **Sample.** We used the same data and variables analyzed by Beall et al. in their analyses.

14 Study 1 considered national-level polling data and Ebola search volume data between September  
15 1 and November 1 aggregated across the U.S. Beall et al. analyzed the relationship between U.S.  
16 country-level voter intentions and U.S. country-level Google searches for “Ebola. In the time  
17 frame of September 1, 2014 to November 1, 2014, aggregate nationwide polling results were  
18 available for 24 days – 9 days preceding the initial Ebola outbreak and 15 days following the  
19 initial outbreak. Beall et al. conducted analyses using this entire sample, as well as an 8-value  
20 subset of this sample (the last week of September and first week of October).

21 Study 2 considered the same variables and time frame as study 1, but aggregated at the  
22 state Senate-election level for 34 out of 36 elections in which data was available (Kansas and  
23 Alabama had insufficient data and were excluded). The variables were either measured at the  
24 level of country (Google searches for “Ebola”) or individual Senate elections (Within-state voter  
25 intentions for each senate election). Of these 34 states, two (Hawaii and Rhode Island) had

26 outlier state-Senate Voter Intention Index scores, and Beall et al. conducted analyses both with  
27 and without them. Beall et al. excluded Virginia from moderation analyses of Partisan Voter  
28 Index, at it had score of 0 (See “Variables”).

29 Study 3 considered the same variables and time frame as study 1, but used Canadian  
30 nationwide polling results and Google Searches for “Ebola”. In the time frame of September 1,  
31 2014 to November 1, 2014, aggregate nationwide polling results were available for 9 days. Beall  
32 et al. solely conducted analyses using this sample.

33 While we attempted to use the same dataset as Beall et al., there were some differences  
34 between our dataset and theirs. While the original Beall et al. analyses for study 1 contained data  
35 points for each of 24 days, our study 1 analyses contained change scores for 23 pairs of days.  
36 Controlling for first-order autocorrelation required calculating changes from one data value to  
37 the next. This resulted in the loss of the first data-point in the time series, for which changes  
38 could not be calculated. In study 2, calculating changes to control for first-order autocorrelation  
39 resulted in the exclusion of six state-Senate elections (Idaho, Mississippi, Nebraska, Tennessee,  
40 West Virginia, and Wyoming). These had insufficient data points to calculate correlations (i.e.  
41 less than three) and were excluded from our analyses. Because our resulting sample of state-  
42 senate elections differed from that of Beall et al., we also re-conducted the original Beall et al.  
43 analyses, excluding these states. In study 3, the original Beall et al. analyses contained data  
44 points for 9 days, while our analyses contained change scores for 8 pairs of days. As in study 1,  
45 controlling for autocorrelation resulted in the loss of the first data-point in the time series, for  
46 which changes could not be calculated. Table S1 summarizes exclusions, inclusions, and results  
47 across all analyses.


48 **Table S1 – Comparison of results across three approaches: (1) original analysis, (2) original analysis on the**  
49 **subsample used for detrending, (3) detrended analysis (i.e. first-order autocorrelation removed) on subsample.**

	Original analysis (before detrending)	Subsample analysis (before detrending)	Detrended analysis on subsample
<b>Correlations of Ebola Search Volume &amp; Voter Intentions</b>	<b>r</b>	<b>r</b>	<b>r</b>
U.S. National <sup>a</sup>	0.51*	NA	0.30
Canada National <sup>c</sup>	0.69*	NA	0.65
All States <sup>b</sup>	0.31*	0.19	0.04
Republican-Leading Elections <sup>b</sup>	0.51***	0.39*	0.09
Democratic-Leading Elections <sup>b</sup>	-0.08	-0.08	-0.03
Positive (Republican) PVI <sup>b</sup>	0.55***	0.43*	0.13
Negative (Democratic) PVI <sup>b</sup>	-0.12	-0.12	-0.05
<b>Differences between correlations</b>	<b>d</b>	<b>d</b>	<b>d</b>
Republican vs. Democratic-Leading Elections <sup>b</sup>	0.92*	0.70	0.24
Positive vs. Negative PVI states <sup>b</sup>	1.11**	0.85*	0.37

51 Table S1 lists correlations between the Ebola Search Volume Index (ESVI) and the Voter-Intention Index (VII) across  
52 all analyses. Column 1 lists correlations in the original Beall et al. analysis. Detrending (Column 3) was only possible on a  
53 subsample of the original Beall et al. data. To demonstrate that using this subsample did not fundamentally alter the relationships  
54 in the original Beall et al. data, we replicated the original Beall et al. analyses using this same subsample (Column 2). \*  
55 Significant at  $p < 0.05$  \*\* Significant at  $p < 0.01$  \*\*\* Significant at  $p < 0.001$ . <sup>a</sup> refers to Study 1. <sup>b</sup> refers to Study 2. <sup>c</sup> refers to  
56 Study 3.


57 **Variables.** *Voter Intention Index (VII).* Voter intentions were estimated from nationwide  
58 polling data from Pollster, a poll-aggregation website. For each day on which data was available,  
59 the Pollster website specified the percentage of potential voters within the United States who  
60 indicated an intention to vote for each candidate from either the Republican or Democratic Party.  
61 To generate VII values, Beall et al. subtracted the percentage of voters who intended to vote  
62 Democrat from the percentage of voters who intended to vote Republican. As such, positive VII

63 values indicated nationwide preference for Republican candidates and negative VII values  
64 indicated nationwide preference for Democrats (See Fig. S1). For study 2, Beall et al. used the  
65 same procedure as in study 1 to generate the VII for each state-Senate election on the days such  
66 polling data was available. For study 3, Beall et al. used the same procedure as in study 1 to  
67 generate the VII based on Canadian nationwide polling data regarding preferences for the  
68 Conservative Party versus New Democratic Party. Positive VII values indicated Canadian  
69 nationwide preference for the Conservative Party and negative VII values indicated Canadian  
70 nationwide preference for the New Democratic Party (See Fig. S2).



71  
72 Fig. S1. Nationwide Voting Intentions across Time, Operationalized via the Voter Intention Index (VII). The Voter  
73 Intention Index (VII) steadily decreases throughout most of September, and steadily increases from late September to November  
74 1.

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Fig. S2. Canadian Nationwide Voting Intentions across Time, Operationalized via the Canadian Voter Intention Index (VII). The Canadian VII decreases throughout most of September, and steadily increases from late September to late October, before again decreasing in late October.

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*Ebola Search Volume Index (ESVI)*. For the time period of August 26, 2014 to November

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1, Beall et al. obtained internet search volume data for the term “Ebola” from Google Trends.

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For each day from September 1, 2014 to November 1, 2014, Beall et al. took the arithmetic mean

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“Ebola” daily search volume from the previous 7 days, ending on and including the specified

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day. This resulted in an Ebola search-volume index (ESVI). The ESVI was used in both study 1

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
and study 2 as the measure of Ebola’s psychological salience (See Fig. S3.). For study 3, Beall et

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al. used Google Trends data from Canada to assess nationwide internet search volumes for

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“Ebola” (See Fig. S4.).




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Fig. S3. Ebola’s Psychological Salience across Time, Operationalized via Google Search Volumes for the term “Ebola”. The Ebola Search Volume Index (ESVI) is insensitive to daily fluctuations in raw Google search volumes for “Ebola”



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93 Fig. S4. Ebola's Psychological Salience in Canada across Time, Operationalized via Canadian Google Search Volumes  
94 for the term "Ebola". The Canadian Ebola Search Volume Index (ESVI) is insensitive to daily fluctuations in raw Canadian  
95 Google search volumes for "Ebola".

96 *Candidate Leading Polls at Time of Ebola Outbreak:* In study 2, Beall et al. used VII  
97 values to categorize each state-Senate election as being led by a Democratic (n=11) or  
98 Republican (n=22) candidate at the time of the Ebola outbreak. This categorization was based on  
99 the most recent poll preceding the outbreak.

100 *Partisan Voter Index (PVI):* Beall et al. use data from the 2014 Cook Political Report's  
101 Partisan Voter Index (<http://www.cookpolitical.com/story/5604>) as a measure of a state's  
102 "enduring political norms". While this link only lists district-specific PVI scores for 2014, Beall  
103 et al. use state-level PVI scores in their analyses. How state-level PVI scores were generated was  
104 not reported in Beall et al.'s paper, but it appears that a state's PVI score is the arithmetic mean  
105 of the PVI scores of all districts in that state. States with positive PVI scores were categorized as  
106 generally Republican (n=19) and states with negative PVI scores were categorized as generally  
107 Democratic (n=12). Virginia had a PVI score of 0 and was excluded from PVI analyses.

## 108 ANALYTICAL STRATEGY

109 In study 1, Beall et al. examined correlations between national-level VII time series and  
110 1) ESVI time series for the 24 days in September and October for which this data was available,  
111 as well as 2) raw Ebola search volumes for the 8 days during the two-week period that included  
112 the last week of September and the first week of October. In study 2, Beall et al. assessed  
113 correlations between state-specific VII values and ESVI values, and examined whether these  
114 correlations were greater in states that had higher initial support for Republicans. In study 3,  
115 Beall et al. examined correlations between Canadian national-level VII time series for the 9 days  
116 in September and October for which this data was available.

117           These initial analyses did not investigate first-order autocorrelation or fully detrend the  
118 data to address it. To assess levels of first-order autocorrelation, we re-analyzed the same  
119 variables by lagging an observation from each variable ( $x$ ) to the temporally adjacent observation  
120 ( $x + 1$ ), and then correlated  $x$  with  $x+1$ . The resulting correlation is a measure of how predictive  
121 the value of a variable at timepoint  $x$  is of the value of that same variable at timepoint  $x + 1$ .

122           To remove first-order autocorrelation from the variables, we subtracted the value of that  
123 variable at time  $x$  from its value at time  $x+1$ . We then repeated the Beall et al. analyses with  
124 these detrended variables. For study 1, we created a lagged VII variable (lagged from the  
125 temporally prior observation), and subtracted the original VII data from this lagged VII variable.  
126 This resulted in a new variable, “VII Changes”, which contained changes for 23 pairs of adjacent  
127 days compared to 24 days for which the original VII had data (1 day lost due to calculating the  
128 changes). “VII Changes” measures the marginal increase or decrease in the VII during any given  
129 time period. We used this same strategy to calculate the changes in ESVI, for each day that data  
130 on “VII Changes” was also available. This resulted in an “ESVI Changes” variable, which  
131 contained data for the same 23 days for which “VII Changes” data was available. Once we  
132 created these variables, we ran bivariate correlations, for both the entire time period for which  
133 data was available and for just the two-week period that included the last week of September and  
134 the first week of October, replicating Beall et al.’s analysis.

135           For study 2, we used the same strategy as study 1 to calculate the changes in VII and  
136 ESVI for each state-Senate election. Because daily changes were calculated by subtracting a  
137 variable’s value at time  $x$  from its value at time  $x+1$ , this resulted in “State-Specific VII  
138 Changes” and “State-Specific ESVI Changes” variables of size  $n-1$ , where  $n$  was the total  
139 number of data points for that election in the original data. We then re-conduct Beall et al.’s

140 correlational time-series analyses, controlling for first-order autocorrelation, by using “State-  
141 Specific VII Changes” instead of “VII” and “State-Specific ESVI Changes” instead of “ESVI”.

142 For study 3, we used the same strategy as study 1 to calculate the changes in Canadian  
143 VII and Canadian ESVI, for the 9 days for which data was available. This resulted in “Canadian  
144 VII Changes” and “Canadian ESVI Changes” variables that contained data regarding changes for  
145 8 pairs of adjacent days (1 day lost due to calculating the changes). As in study 1, we ran  
146 bivariate correlations between these variables for the entire time period for which data was  
147 available.

148 We also directly replicated Beall et al.’s results and report 95% Confidence Intervals for  
149 their correlations.

## 150 RESULTS

### 151 **Is there temporal autocorrelation in the time series?**

152 Table S2 summarizes first-order autocorrelations of the key variables in studies 1, 2, and  
153 3. All variables in the original Beall et al. data exhibited extremely high levels of first-order  
154 autocorrelation. This was especially true for the 7-day aggregate ESVI used in the original study,  
155 because each aggregate ESVI value was made up of 6 of the 7 same values as the previous  
156 aggregate ESVI value. Calculating the changes between data values resulted in strongly  
157 attenuated levels of autocorrelation, although some autocorrelation still remained for VII  
158 Changes and ESVI changes. Three state-Senate elections (Montana, South Carolina 1, and South  
159 Carolina 2) had insufficient data points to calculate autocorrelation in VII Changes and were  
160 excluded from this analysis. There was no evidence that these exclusions affected the level of  
161 autocorrelation in the raw state-Senate election VII data ( $r = 0.75$ ,  $N = 23$ ,  $p < 0.001$ , 95% CI  
162 [0.58, 0.92]).

163 **Table S2: Autocorrelation of key variables.**

	<b>N - Beall et al. Data</b>	<b>Raw Beall et al. Data</b>	<b>Detrended Beall et al. data</b>
Raw Ebola Search Volumes (U.S. national) <sup>a, b</sup>	23	0.64*** [0.32, 0.84].	-0.37 [-0.69, 0.06]
ESVI (U.S. national) <sup>a, b</sup>	23	0.94*** [0.85, 0.97]	0.60** [0.23, 0.81]
ESVI (Canada national) <sup>c</sup>	8	0.63 [-0.14, 0.92]	0.11 [-0.70, 0.80])
VII (U.S. national) <sup>a</sup>	23	0.95*** [0.89, 0.98]),	0.43* [0.10, 0.72]
VII (Canada national) <sup>c</sup>	8	0.69 [-0.04, 0.94]	0.58 [-0.31, 0.93]
VII (U.S. State-level average) <sup>b</sup>	26	0.76*** [0.61, 0.92]	0.03 [-0.16, 0.22]

164 Table S2 lists first-order autocorrelations of the key variables in studies 1, 2, and 3 (Column 1). Column 2 lists  
165 autocorrelations after detrending (i.e. removing 1<sup>st</sup>-order autocorrelation). 95% Confidence Intervals are listed in brackets. \*  
166 Significant at  $p < 0.05$  \*\* Significant at  $p < 0.01$  \*\*\* Significant at  $p < 0.001$ . <sup>a</sup> refers to Study 1. <sup>b</sup> refers to Study 2. <sup>c</sup> refers to  
167 Study 3. N of detrended data is always one less than the raw data.

168 **Do internet searches for “Ebola” predict people’s intentions to vote for conservative**  
169 **candidates at the national level?**

170 In study 1, Beall et al. found that the ESVI was positively and significantly correlated  
171 with the VII ( $r = .51$ ,  $p = 0.012$ ,  $N = 24$  days, 95% CI [0.13, 0.76]). They also found a large,  
172 positive but non-significant correlation between raw Google Trends “Ebola” search volumes and  
173 the VII for the two-week period that included the last week of September and the first week of  
174 October ( $r = 0.61$ ,  $p=0.111$ ,  $N = 8$  days, 95% CI [-0.17, 0.92]).

175 When removing first-order autocorrelation, the correlation between VII Changes and  
176 ESVI Changes was substantially lower, and no longer significant ( $r = 0.30$ ,  $p = 0.159$ ,  $N = 23$ ,  
177 95% CI [-0.12, 0.64]) for the months of September and October. When we replicated the  
178 additional Beall et al. correlation of raw Google Trends “Ebola” search volume with VII over the

179 two-week period that included the last week of September and the first week of October, the  
180 correlation of detrended variables was still non-significant, but also no longer had the  
181 suggestively high, positive magnitude ( $r = -0.19$ ,  $p > .250$ ,  $N = 8$  days, 95% CI [-0.79, 0.60]).

182 In study 3, Beall et al. found that the Canadian ESVI was positively and significantly  
183 correlated with the Canadian VII ( $r = .69$ ,  $p = 0.042$ ,  $N = 9$  days, 95% CI [0.04, 0.93]), as well as  
184 the Canadian voter-intention-change-index ( $r=0.76$ ,  $p = 0.017$ ,  $N = 9$  days, 95% CI [0.20, 0.95]).


185 When removing first-order autocorrelation, the correlation between Canadian ESVI  
186 Changes and Canadian VII Changes was slightly reduced, and no longer significant ( $r = 0.65$ ,  $p =$   
187  $0.08$ ,  $N = 8$  days, 95% CI [-0.11, 0.93]). We did not analyze the relationship between Canadian  
188 ESVI and the Canadian *voter-intention-change-index* (See Detailed Discussion for justification)

### 189 **Do internet searches for “Ebola” predict people’s intentions to vote for Republican** 190 **candidates at the state-level?**

191 In study 2, Beall et al. found that, across 32 Senate elections, the arithmetic mean of the  
192 correlations between ESVI and the state-specific VII was significantly greater than 0 (mean  $r =$   
193  $0.31$ ,  $p = 0.016$ ,  $N = 32$ , CI [0.06, 0.55]), though it reduced (mean  $r = 0.24$ ,  $p = 0.057$ ,  $N = 34$ ,  
194 95% CI [-0.01, 0.49]) if outliers Hawaii and Rhode Island were included. Most of these  
195 correlations took on either extreme positive or extreme negative values (see Fig. S5.). When  
196 considering only those 28 states with sufficient data for later comparison with a detrended  
197 analysis (at least three time points), the arithmetic mean of the correlations between ESVI and  
198 the state-specific VII was lower with the two outliers excluded (mean  $r = 0.19$ ,  $p = 0.18$ ,  $N = 26$ ,  
199 95% CI [-0.09, 0.47]) and included (mean  $r = 0.12$ ,  $p = 0.18$ ,  $N = 28$ , 95% CI [-0.16, 0.39]).

200 Once detrending the two key variables, the arithmetic mean of correlations between  
201 “ESVI Changes” and “VII Changes” across 28 Senate elections was reduced to nearly zero and

202 was no longer significant (mean  $r = 0.04$ ,  $p > .250$ ,  $N = 26$ ,  $CI [-0.16, 0.23]$ ) and was (mean  $r =$   
203  $0.03$ ,  $p > .250$ ,  $N = 28$ ,  $CI [-0.15, 0.21]$ ) when outliers Hawaii and Rhode Island were included.  
204 Neither of these were significantly different from 0. The detrended correlations no longer took  
205 on extreme negative or extreme positive values, and their distribution more closely resembled a  
206 normal distribution (see Fig. S5).



207  
208 Fig. S5. Distribution of Correlations between Ebola Search Volume Index (ESVI) and Voter Intention Index (VII) for  
209 1) The original 32-election Beall et al. data and 2) A 26-election subset of the Beall et al. data after removing 1<sup>st</sup>-order  
210 autocorrelation. Correlations in the original 32-election Beall et al. data take on extreme values and were bimodally distributed.  
211 Removing 1<sup>st</sup>-order autocorrelation resulted in a distribution of correlations more closely resembling a normal distribution.

212 **Does a state-level bandwagon effect moderate the relationship between internet searches**  
213 **for “Ebola” and people’s intentions to vote for Republican candidates?**

214 In the second part of study 2, Beall et al. found that, across 32 Senate elections, the  
215 arithmetic mean correlation between ESVI and the state-specific VII was positive for elections in  
216 which a Republican led the polls at the time of the initial Ebola Outbreak (mean  $r = 0.51$ ,  $N = 21$ ,

217  $p < 0.001$ , CI [0.26, 0.75]) but not for elections in which a Democrat led the polls at that time  
218 (mean  $r = -0.08$ ,  $N = 11$ ,  $p > .250$ , CI [-0.60, 0.44]). This difference was statistically significant  
219 ( $d = 0.92$ ,  $t(30) = 2.52$ ,  $p = 0.017$ ). With outliers Hawaii and Rhode Island included, they found a  
220 similar pattern for Republican leading states (mean  $r = 0.51$ ,  $N = 21$ ,  $p < 0.001$ , 95% CI [0.26,  
221 0.75]) and for Democratic leading states (mean  $r = -0.19$ ,  $N = 13$ ,  $p > .250$ , 95% CI [-0.65,  
222 0.27]). When considering only those 28 states that had at least three time points (for comparison  
223 with a later detrended analysis), the arithmetic mean correlation between ESVI and the state-  
224 specific VII was still positive and statistically significant (mean  $r = 0.39$ ,  $N = 15$ ,  $p = .021$ , 95%  
225 CI [0.07, 0.70]) for Republican leading states but not for Democratic leading states (mean  $r = -$   
226  $0.08$ ,  $N = 11$ ,  $p > .250$ , CI [-0.60, 0.44]). The difference between these was not statistically  
227 significant (Welch Two Sample t-test ( $t = 1.69$ ,  $df = 17.64$ ,  $p = 0.109$ )). With outliers Hawaii and  
228 Rhode Island included, the pattern was similar for Republican (mean  $r = 0.39$ ,  $N = 15$ ,  $p = .021$ ,  
229 95% CI [0.07, 0.70]) and Democratic (mean  $r = -0.19$ ,  $N = 13$ ,  $p > .250$ , 95% CI [-0.65, 0.27])  
230 leading states.

231 In contrast, when removing 1<sup>st</sup> order autocorrelation, we found no evidence of a  
232 moderating effect of party leading the polls at the time of the outbreak on the correlation between  
233 Ebola searches and people's voting intentions. The arithmetic mean correlation between "ESVI  
234 Changes" and "VII Changes" across 26 Senate elections was (mean  $r = 0.09$ ,  $N = 15$ ,  $p > .250$ ,  
235 95% CI [-0.18, 0.35]) for elections in which a Republican led the polls at the time of the  
236 outbreak and (mean  $r = -0.03$ ,  $N = 11$ ,  $p > .250$ , 95% CI [-0.38, 0.31]) for elections in which a  
237 Democrat led the polls at the time of the outbreak. This pattern held when outliers Hawaii and  
238 Rhode Island were included for Republican leading elections (mean  $r = 0.09$ ,  $N = 15$ ,  $p > .250$ ,  
239 95% CI [-0.18, 0.35]) and Democrat leading elections (mean  $r = -0.03$ ,  $N = 13$ ,  $p > .250$ , 95% CI

240 [-0.32, 0.25]). Neither of these were significantly different from 0. Further, they were not  
241 significantly different from each other (Welch Two Sample t-test, outliers excluded:  $t = 0.59$ ,  $df$   
242  $= 20.60$ ,  $p > .250$ ; Welch Two Sample t-test, outliers included: ( $t = 0.66$ ,  $df = 25.49$ ,  $p > .250$ )).

243 In a related analysis, Beall et al. found that, across 31 Senate elections, the arithmetic  
244 mean correlation between ESVI and the state-specific VII was positive for elections with  
245 Republican-leaning PVI scores (mean  $r = 0.55$ ,  $N = 19$ ,  $p < 0.001$ , 95% CI [0.30, 0.81]) but not  
246 for those with Democrat-leaning PVI scores (mean  $r = -0.12$ ,  $N = 12$ ,  $p > .250$ , 95% CI [-0.58,  
247 0.34]). This difference was statistically significant ( $d = 1.11$ ,  $t(29) = 3.00$ ,  $p = 0.005$ ). With  
248 outliers Hawaii and Rhode Island included, they found a similar pattern (mean  $r = 0.55$ ,  $N = 19$ ,  
249  $p < 0.001$ , 95% CI [0.30, 0.81]) for positive PVI states and (mean  $r = -0.22$ ,  $N = 14$ ,  $p > .250$ ,  
250 95% CI [-0.63, 0.19]) for negative PVI states. When considering only those 27 states that had at  
251 least three time points for comparison with a later detrended analysis, the arithmetic mean  
252 correlation between ESVI and the state-specific VII was positive, and statistically significant for  
253 Republican-leaning states (mean  $r = 0.43$ ,  $N = 13$ ,  $p = .020$ , 95% CI [0.08, 0.78]) but not for  
254 Democrat-leaning states (mean  $r = -0.12$ ,  $N = 12$ ,  $p > .250$ , 95% CI [-0.58, 0.34]). This  
255 difference was statistically significant (Welch Two Sample t-test: ( $t = 2.11$ ,  $df = 21.17$ ,  $p =$   
256  $0.047$ ). With outliers Hawaii and Rhode Island included, the pattern was similar for Republican-  
257 leaning (mean  $r = 0.43$ ,  $N = 13$ ,  $p = 0.020$ , 95% CI [0.08, 0.78]) and Democrat-leaning (mean  $r =$   
258  $-0.22$ ,  $N = 14$ ,  $p > .250$ , 95% CI [-0.63, 0.19]) states.

259 In contrast, when controlling for first-order autocorrelation, we found that the moderating  
260 effect of state PVI on the correlation between Ebola searches and people's voting intentions  
261 disappeared. The arithmetic mean correlation between "ESVI Changes" and "VII Changes"  
262 across 25 Senate elections was small and non-significant for both Republican-leaning states

263 (mean  $r = 0.13$ ,  $N = 13$ ,  $p > .250$ , 95% CI  $[-0.19, 0.45]$ ) and Democrat-leaning states (mean  $r = -$   
264  $0.05$ ,  $N = 12$ ,  $p > .250$ , 95% CI  $[-0.34, 0.24]$ ). This pattern held when outliers Hawaii and Rhode  
265 Island were included (Republican-leaning states: mean  $r = 0.13$ ,  $N = 13$ ,  $p > .250$ , 95% CI  $[-0.19,$   
266  $0.45]$ ; Democrat-leaning states: mean  $r = -0.05$ ,  $N = 14$ ,  $p > .250$ , 95% CI  $[-0.29, 0.19]$ ). Neither  
267 of these were significantly different from zero. Further, they were not significantly different from  
268 each other (Welch Two Sample t-test, outliers excluded:  $t = 0.92$ ,  $df = 22.94$ ,  $p > .250$ ; Welch  
269 Two Sample t-test, outliers included: ( $t = 0.97$ ,  $df = 23.07$ ,  $p > .250$ ).

## 270 **DETAILED DISCUSSION**

271 In their paper, Beall et al. used time-series data to test the hypothesis that the 2014 Ebola  
272 outbreak influenced the 2014 U.S. Federal elections. They found that the volume of Google  
273 searches for “Ebola” strongly covaried with support for conservative candidates, at both the  
274 national and state level, and that the correlation between support for Republican candidates and  
275 Ebola search volume was strongest in U.S. states with greater support of Republican candidates  
276 and with longstanding Republican voting norms. However, Beall et al. assumed that time series  
277 observations were independent of each other, whereas we showed that all analyzed variables  
278 exhibited extremely high degrees of temporal autocorrelation (See Table S2). Here we  
279 reanalyzed the Beall et al. data, controlling for first-order autocorrelation, and found that  
280 essentially all relationships between the Ebola outbreak and people’s voting intentions became  
281 attenuated and non-significant (See Table S1). Because the Beall et al. findings were not robust  
282 to such basic controls, this strongly suggests that either: (1) many of the initial findings were  
283 either spurious or (2) the study design used by Beall et al. was insufficiently powered to detect  
284 any associations that may actually exist.

285 In study 1, we found that the positive correlation between ESVI and VII in September  
286 and October dropped substantially and became non-significant after removing first-order  
287 autocorrelation. If we focused on only the two-week period that included the last week of  
288 September and first week of October, and instead analyzed the relationship between raw Google  
289 Trends “Ebola” search volumes and VII, we found that the positive correlation between these  
290 two variables disappeared entirely after removing first-order autocorrelation.

291 In study 2, we found that the positive correlations between national ESVI and state-  
292 Senate election VII across all available states became indistinguishable from zero after removing  
293 those states that didn’t have sufficient data for detrending, and dropped to values very close to  
294 zero when removing first-order autocorrelation. Further, we also found that the moderating  
295 effects of candidate leading the polls at time of the outbreak and state-level PVI disappeared  
296 after removing first-order autocorrelation. These results were robust to the composition of the  
297 sample (including/excluding outliers; excluding/including six states with insufficient data on  
298 daily changes). The state-Senate election data was the most fine-grained of all the Beall et al.  
299 data and contained the largest number of data points. As such, it afforded the best test of the  
300 hypothesis that the psychological salience of Ebola affected people’s voting intentions in during  
301 the 2014 U.S. elections. Our analyses revealed no evidence for this purported relationship: there  
302 is no evidence from this data that increases in national-level Google searches for “Ebola” were  
303 associated with people’s tendency to favor Republican or Democratic candidates in state-Senate  
304 elections. Further, there is no evidence for an increased inclination to conform to popular opinion  
305 with increases in national-level Google searches for “Ebola”.

306 In study 3, we found that the positive correlation between Canadian ESVI and Canadian  
307 VII in September and October dropped slightly and became non-significant after removing first-

308 order autocorrelation. Study 3's small sample size (9 data points, 8 after controlling for first-  
309 order autocorrelation) meant that it provided the least informative test of any hypothesis (while  
310 the point estimate for the correlation between Canadian VII changes and Canadian ESVI changes  
311 was  $r = 0.65$ , the confidence interval was  $CI[-0.11 \text{ to } 0.93]$ ). This sample size is much too small  
312 for an appropriate time series analysis (Jebb, Tay, Wang, & Huang, 2015), and thus the original  
313 study design was likely insufficiently powered to detect potential associations or test the  
314 proposed hypotheses. Given that underpowered research designs increase the probability of  
315 generating false positives and result in exaggerated effect-size estimates (Button et al., 2013), we  
316 are hesitant to make much of study 3.

317 **The dangers of analyzing smoothed time-series data.** Beall et al. obtained their voter-  
318 intention data from "Pollster", a poll-aggregation website  
319 (<http://elections.huffingtonpost.com/pollster>). Pollster has several settings for data smoothing  
320 (i.e. Less Smoothing, Moderate, More Smoothing) and Beall et al. used the "more smoothed"  
321 version of the Pollster data in their analyses. This is problematic: smoothing can lead to greater  
322 temporal autocorrelation in data points, because their value is increasingly artificially determined  
323 by the value of neighboring data points. As a consequence, smoothing can lead to a number of  
324 problems including misestimation of parameters and dramatic underestimates of standard errors,  
325 resulting in spurious inferences for correlations. Beall et al.'s study 1 provides a salient example.  
326 Analyzing the "more smoothed" version of the Pollster data, Beall et al. show a plot (Figure 1)  
327 illustrating that the upward trend in intentions to vote for conservative candidates (i.e. VII) one  
328 week after the Ebola outbreak in the U.S. was stronger than the trend during the week prior to the  
329 outbreak. However, when analyzing the "less smoothed" version of the same data, we found the  
330 *opposite* result: the Ebola outbreak was associated with a reverse in the temporal trajectory of

331 VII scores (i.e. increased voter intentions to vote for *democratic* candidates). This illustrates one  
332 of the perils of using smoothed data, and suggests that Beall et al.’s findings may crucially  
333 depend on the smoothing procedure that generated the data<sup>1</sup>. (See <https://osf.io/d9jfz/> for data  
334 and code. “Study1\_Data\_VariousLevelsOfSmoothing.csv” contains Study 1 data in its various  
335 forms. The “VoterIntentionIndex\_LessSmoothed\_Pollster” column is the “less smoothed”  
336 pollster data. The “VoterIntentionIndex\_FromStudy1” column is the “more smoothed” data used  
337 by Beall et al. data. The “VoterIntentionIndex\_Smoothed\_Pollster” column is the “more  
338 smoothed” data when downloaded from Pollster (<https://goo.gl/aB8VR1>) on May 1, 2017.  
339 “Study1\_AdditionalAnalyses.R” contains the relevant R code.).

340 **An alternative to detrending data.** In those cases when detrended time series are not  
341 appropriate for answering a specific research question, there are other potential approaches to  
342 dealing with temporal autocorrelation. One approach is to simulate the expected distribution of  
343 cross time-series correlations at different levels of lag-1 autocorrelation. Doing so allows one to  
344 plot two *causally unrelated* time series with varying levels of autocorrelation and generate the  
345 expected distribution of correlations between them. It takes as input the observed first-order  
346 temporal autocorrelation in the two empirical time series of interest (as well as the sample size).  
347 For example, below is a simulation for two time series with first-order autocorrelation of 0.90 (ar  
348 = c(0.9)) and sample size  $n = 23$ . Below, we provide the R code (also available at  
349 <https://osf.io/d9jfz/>, in the file titled “Study1\_AdditionalAnalyses.R”) for plotting this  
350 distribution. This simple simulation demonstrates that highly-autocorrelated time series (such as  
351 those analyzed by Beall et al.) will frequently be highly correlated with one another, even though

---

<sup>1</sup> This example arose out of productive conversations with the original study authors about different ways of analysing the data from Study 1.

352 they are causally unrelated. This approach does not necessarily remove threats from higher-order  
353 autocorrelations or other factors, but it is another useful first-line defense.

```
354 simnum<-10000
355 simul <- matrix(nrow=simnum, ncol=1, 0)
356 for (i in 1:simnum){
357 ar.sim<-arima.sim(model=list(ar=c(.9)),n=23)
358 ar.sim2<-arima.sim(model=list(ar=c(.9)),n=23)
359 simul[i] <- cor(ar.sim,ar.sim2)
360 }
361 hist(simul)
362 quantile(simul,c(0.025,0.975))
363
364 ar.sim<-arima.sim(model=list(ar=c(.94)),n=23)
365 acf(ar.sim)
```

367 **Caveats.** Here, we focused our analyses on the more fine-grained time-series data  
368 analyzed by Beall et al., as it provided the strongest test of their hypotheses. The fact that support  
369 for Republican candidates was higher after announcement of the Ebola epidemic than before the  
370 announcement was obviously suggestive, but was not particularly informative for the proposed  
371 hypotheses given that it represented 2 observations (before and after) from a single data point—  
372 national-level means. Beall et al. also constructed a *voter-intention-change-index*, which  
373 assessed the difference between that day's VII and the VII 7 days before, resulting in 16 data  
374 points (study 1) and 9 data points (study 3). This was a useful start toward a fully detrended  
375 analysis, but it only detrended one of the variables. Further, we were unable to determine why  
376 study 3's *voter-intention-change-index* contained 9 instead of 8 data points (one data point  
377 should have been lost when calculating changes). Given these issues, we created our own  
378 variables for assessing changes between data points. Finally, the Beall et al. analysis of how  
379 state-level pre-post changes differed across Republican- or Democrat-leaning states was  
380 suggestive. However, it also raises interesting questions about spatial and cultural autocorrelation

381 that are not the direct topic of this paper, but deserve additional exploration (Hruschka &  
382 Henrich, 2013).

383 Our re-analysis of the Beall et al. data had a number of limitations. Because of the small  
384 sample size in the original data, the analyses were insufficiently powered to detect potential  
385 associations. Of course, this is a concern with any analyses of the existing Beall et al. data,  
386 suggesting the current data may not be sufficiently powered to test these hypotheses. Indeed,  
387 some guidelines suggest a minimum of 50 data points for time series analyses (Jebb et al., 2015).  
388 After controlling for first-order autocorrelation, none of the purported associations between  
389 Google searches for “Ebola” and people’s voter intentions remained significant, though it is  
390 possible that such associations can only be detected in a longer time-series. Thus, while the  
391 current analyses have a number of limitations, these are the same caveats that apply to the  
392 original Beall et al. analyses.

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